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Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony:
In Support of the Emerging Majority
and People v. Hughes
INTRODUCTION
N the past few decades, the use of hypnosis as an aid in criminal
investigations by law enforcement agencies has been on the rise.
Large cities are increasingly providing special training in the use
of hypnotic procedures for selected police personnel, as have
some federal law enforcement agencies.' At the same time, the
ease of learning hypnotic induction in a short amount of time has
enabled local sheriffs and police officers to receive similar train-
ing.' Retaining qualified psychologists to invoke hypnosis in an in-
vestigatory context has likewise become an easy task.'
Not surprisingly, this revolution in investigatory practice has
been accompanied by a substantial number of cases attempting to
judicially define the limits of the proper use in the trial setting of
material retrieved by hypnosis. One line of cases has held nearly
unanimously that actual statements made by a witness while under
hypnosis may not be introduced to establish the truth of the state-
ments, with the court in each instance relying to some extent on
the probable unreliability of such statements.' In sharp contrast to
this unanimity, a varied range of results has characterized cases
where pretrial hypnosis has been utilized to refresh the memory
1. Police departments in New York, Los Angeles, Houston, Seattle, Denver, Washing-
ton D.C., and Portland all provide special training in hypnotic induction as do the FBI and
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. See Monrose, Justice With Glazed Eyes: The
Growing Use of Hypnosis in Law Enforcement, Jutxs DR. Oct.-Nov. 1978, at 54, cited in Dia-
mond, Inherent Problems in the Use of Hypnotism on a Prospective Witness, 68 CAMF. L. REV.
313, 313 n.1 (1980).
2. Diamond, supra note 1, at 314.
3. Id. at 313.
4. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 117 Misc. 2d 737, 459 N.Y.S.2d 528, 540 (Sup. Ct. 1983);
People v. Blair, 25 Cal. 3d 640, 602 P.2d 738, 159 Cal. Rptr. 818 (1977); Greenfield v.
Commonwealth, 214 Va. 710, 204 S.E.2d 414 (1974); State v. Pusch, 77 N.D. 860, 46
N.W.2d 508 (1951); Jones v. State, 542 P.2d 1316 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975); Greenfield v.
Robinson, 413 F. Supp. 1113 (W.D. Va. 1976); Strong v. State, 435 N.E.2d 969 (Ind.
1982); State v. Pierce, 263 S.C. 23, 207 S.E.2d 414 (1974).
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of a witness who subsequently seeks to testify at trial. It is this
latter, unsettled issue which the New York Court of Appeals ad-
dressed for the first time in People v. Hughes.5
In Hughes, the victim of a brutal rape, after suffering trau-
matic injuries in the attack, was unable to positively identify her
assailant.' After a series of hypnotic sessions aimed at refreshing
her memory, and another using sodium pentothal, she subse-
quently identified a neighbor as her assailant, repeating the identi-
fication at trial.' The court held that the testimony of a victim or
witness subjected to hypnosis prior to trial is not admissible with
respect to details recalled only after the hypnotic sessions., With
respect to matters recalled prior to hypnosis, the court ruled that
a trial court should decide at a pretrial hearing, on a case-by-case
basis, both the extent of the prospective witness's pre-hypnotic
recollection and whether the hypnotic sessions were so impermis-
sibly suggestive as to preclude trial testimony regarding pre-hyp-
notic recallY
5. 59 N.Y.2d 523, 453 N.E.2d 484, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255 (1983).
6. The victim had suffered traumatic injuries to the head and neck. After inquiries by
her sister over several visits to the hospital, the victim stated that at times she "saw Kirk,"
the neighbor-defendant. Three days later she recalled being grabbed by the throat by a
man with glasses and smooth hair. She later stated that when her head stopped spinning
she "kept seeing Kirk."
She was informed that the police suspected the defendant prior to the hypnotic sessions.
A first hypnotic session in the presence of a psychologist, her husband, and an investigative
officer did not result in any increased recall. A second resulted in a positive identification
of the defendant.
Subsequently the victim consulted an independent psychiatrist to confirm the earlier
identification. The two additional hypnotic sessions were unsuccessful in making the confir-
mation. A third session, this time under the influence of sodium pentothal or "truth se-
rum," resulted in her confirming the defendant as her attacker. A final hypnotic session
with the clinical psychologist five weeks after the incident failed to reaffirm a positive iden-
tification of the defendant. Id. at 528-31, 453 N.E.2d at 486-87, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 256-57.
7. Id. at 528-32, 453 N.E.2d at 486-87, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 256-58.
8. Id. at 545, 453 N.E.2d at 493, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 266.
9. Id. at 546, 453 N.E.2d at 494-95, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 546. The constitutional standard
to determine if a pretrial identification procedure amounts to a violation of due process is
whether the procedure was impermissibly suggestive based on a totality of the circum-
stances. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
Applying this standard, the trial court found the identificatiorr testimony admissible in
Hughes. 59 N.Y.2d at 532, 453 N.E.2d at 496, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 256.
In a subsequent decision, the Court of Appeals has made mandatory the pretrial hear-
ing to determine if the hypnotic session was impermissibly suggestive whenever a prosecu-
tion witness has been hypnotized prior to trial, even if no new information is elicited from
the session. See People v. Tunstall, 63 N.Y.2d 1, 468 N.E.2d 30, 479 N.Y.S.2d 192 (1984).
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This distinction in treatment of post-hypnotic and pre-hyp-
notic recall with respect to admissibility0 invoked by New York's
highest court is by no means the generally accepted approach of
the states to the problem of using hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony at criminal trials. Other recent approaches of state courts
range from a per se inadmissible rule declaring a previously hyp-
notized witness incompetent to testify at trial,"1 to the case-by-case
determination of admissibility adopted by the New Jersey Su-
preme Court in State v. Hurd." The former approach, adopted by
the California Supreme Court in People v. Shirley,13 affords a de-
fendant the greatest protection from the inherent unreliability of
hypnotically refreshed testimony. Under the latter approach, the
trial court must determine in each case whether, under the partic-
ular circumstances, the hypnotic procedure used is reasonably
likely to result in recall comparable in reliability to normal recall.
10. For other instances where state courts have drawn the same distinction in treat-
ment as the Hughes court, see Commonwealth v. Kater, 388 Mass. 519, 447 N.E.2d 1190
(1983); Commonwealth v. Taylor, 294 Pa. Super. 171, 439 A.2d 805 (1982); State ex rel.
Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266 (1982); People v. Quintanar, 659
P.2d 710 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Koehler, 312 N.W.2d 108 (Minn. 1981). See also
State v. Palmer, 210 Neb. 206, 313 N.W.2d 648 (1981) (post-hypnotic testimony inadmissi-
ble with respect to subject matter of the hypnotic session, but making no finding as to pre-
hypnotic recall while encouraging the proper use of hypnosis to gain leads in a difficult
case); Peterson v. State, 448 N.E.2d 673 (Ind. 1983) (general testimony of witness subject
to hypnosis admissible though identification induced and tainted by hypnosis inadmissible);
State v. Seager, 341 N.W.2d 420 (Iowa 1983) (trial testimony offered that is substantially
the same as that given by witness prior to hypnosis is admissible). Cases adopting the
Hughes type approach were characterized as the "emerging majority" by Justice Calogero,
dissenting in part in State v. Wren, 425 So. 2d 756, 760 (La. 1983).
11. People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, cert. denied,
459 U.S. 860 (1982). The per se approach reflects the highest judicial concern for the
inherent unreliability of hypnotically refreshed testimony and the resulting danger posed
to the defendant's right to confrontation by cross examination. Id. at 66-67, 641 P.2d at
804, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 272-73.
This right, arising from the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment, was applied
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)
and Smith v. State, 390 U.S. 129 (1968). In Pointer, Justice Black, writing for the majority,
expressed the importance of this basic constitutional right as follows: "There are few sub-
jects, perhaps, upon which this Court and other courts have been more nearly unanimous
than in their expressions of belief that the right of confrontation and cross-examination is
an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country's
constitutional goal." Pointer, 380 U.S. at 405. For a detailed discussion of how pretrial
hypnosis may impair effective defense cross-examination, see infra notes 34-46 and accom-
panying text.
12. 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981).
13. 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982).
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This determination is based in part on required compliance with
six procedural safeguards promulgated by the court.14
After a brief analysis of the inherent reliability problems in
using hypnosis to induce retrieval of details previously unavailable
in normal memory, this Comment will summarize and scrutinize
the rationale of these three recent approaches.' 5 Each approach
14. Hurd, 86 N.J. at 543, 432 A.2d at 92.
15. Thus the scope of this Comment excludes cases adopting the rule that testimony
refreshed by pretrial hypnosis is admissible with the credibility of such testimony to be
weighed by the trier of fact. See, e.g., Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302
(1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969). This rule carried the day without significant criti-
cism for a number of years. See State v. Jorgensen, 8 Or. App. 1, 492 P.2d 312 (1971);
State v. McQueen, 295 N.G. 96, 244 S.E.2d 414 (1978); Clark v. State, 379 So. 2d 372
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); State v. Greer, 609 S.W.2d 423 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Wyller v.
Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Narciso, 446 F.
Supp. 252 (E.D. Mich. 1977); United States v. Awkward, 597 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 885 (1980); Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067, 1069 (9th Cir.
1975); Emmet v. Rickets, 397 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D. Ga. 1975). See also United States v.
Adams, 581 F.2d 193, 198-99 (9th Cir. 1978) (adopting the Harding rule but warning that
great care must be taken that hypnotized subjects' recollection is actual memory).
The approach of the Harding court has since been widely criticized for its lack of judi-
cial notice of the inherent effects of hypnosis contributing to the unreliability of hypnoti-
cally induced recall, its reliance on the testimony of the previously hypnotized witness that
her recall was from her normal memory, and its reliance on expert testimony by a self-
proclaimed "expert" contrary to the basic scientific understanding of hypnosis. See, e.g.,
State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 229-30, 624 P.2d 1274, 1277-78 (1981) (Harding and its
progeny contain no analysis of the effects of hypnosis on the subject and rely on erroneous
assumptions that the subject can distinguish hypnotically suggested memory and that cross-
examination is an effective means of insuring that no false or distorted evidence is admitted
at trial). Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 36, 641 P.2d at 785, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 253. Accord People v.
Gonzalez, 108 Mich. App. 145, 155, 310 N.W.2d 306, 311 (1981); People v. Hughes, 59
N.Y.2d at 537-41, 453 N.E.2d at 490-93, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 261-64; State v. Mack, 292
N.W.2d 764, 770 (Minn. 1980); State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 644
P.2d 1282 (1982). Increasing judicial notice of the effects of hypnosis on a subject's mem-
ory has led to general rejection of the Harding rule in subsequent cases. Indeed, a court
initially adopting the Harding rule has recently reversed itself in favor of applying the gen-
eral acceptance standard for admission of novel scientific evidence. Polk v. State, 48 Md.
App. 382, 396, 427 A.2d 1041, 1049 (1981); Collins v. State, 52 Md. App. 186, 447 A.2d
1272 (1982), affd, 296 Md. 670, 464 A.2d 1028 (1983). For a general discussion of this
standard, see infra note 75.
As Justice Mosk, writing for the majority of the California Supreme Court, stated in
Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 48, 641 P.2d at 792, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 261: "This dramatic turn of
events would appear to give the coup de grace to the moribund precedent [of Harding] relied
on here .... " Clearly the continuing vitality of the Harding approach is dubious. But cf.
Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d 1280, 1282 (Wyo. 1982) (asserting that the Harding rule leaves
ample opportunity to test the credibility of a witness through cross-examination and that a
majority of states are in accord); Gee v. State, 662 P.2d 106, 108 (Wyo. 1983); Note, Evi-
dence-Safeguarding the Admissibility of Hypnotically Enhanced Testimony-State v. Hurd, 5 W.
NEw ENG. L. REv. 281, 287, 289 (1982) (asserting that the Harding approach still com-
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will be considered with respect to judicial notice of the nature of
hypnotically induced recall, the practicality of the legal rules
adopted, and the policy assumptions and considerations implicit in
each. This analysis will suggest that the compromise approach of
Hughes is based on an astute awareness of both the inherent unre-
liability of hypnosis as a memory-jogging device and the tremen-
dous promise hypnosis holds as a useful and efficient investigative
aid when applied in certain types of crimes. As such the Hughes
approach strikes the proper balance between society's interest in
law enforcement use of hypnosis as an investigative aid and the
fundamental right of the defendant to a fair trial.
I. THE NATURE OF HYPNOTICALLY INDUCED RECALL
Theories 6 and definitions' explaining hypnotic phenomena
are numerous and varied. The underlying theme of most defini-
tions is consistent with the general description that hypnosis is "a
state of narrowly focused attention in which the hypnotized per-
son somehow becomes extremely suggestible.""' Despite some dis-
agreement among experts as to why this occurs, certain character-
istics of the hypnotized subject have generally been verified
through scientific observation.' 9
A. Reliability: The Reality and the Myth
The first such verified characteristic is the hypersuggestibility
of the hypnotized subject due to the close emotional bond devel-
oped with the hypnotist.20 As a result, suggestions of an overt na-
mands a majority).
16. For a discussion of the various theories attempting to explain hypnosis, see Dia-
mond, supra note 1, at 317.
17. BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY 668 (5th ed. 1979) defines hypnotism as the "act of in-
ducing artificially a state of sleep or trance in a subject by means of verbal suggestion by
the hypnotist or by the subject's concentration upon some object. It is generally character-
ized by extreme responsiveness to suggestions by the hypnotist." At the same time it has
been described as an increased state of suggestibility "in which the subject is neither asleep
nor unconscious, but is in a reduced state of consciousness." Dilloff, The Admissibility of
Hypnotically Induced Testimony, 4 OHio N.U.L. REV. 1, 3, (1977). Dr. Bernard Diamond, testi-
fying as an expert in State v. Brown, 337 N.W.2d 138, 143 (N.D. 1983), described hypnosis
as "an artifically [sic] induced state of altered consciousness characterized by increased sug-
gestibility, suspension of critical judgment and psychological and physical relaxation."
18. E. LoF-rus, MEMORY 54 (1980).
19. Diamond, supra note 1, at 316.
20. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 63-64, 641 P.2d at 802-03, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 271,
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ture or leading questions by the hypnotist may direct the response
of the subject.21 However, the heightened suggestibility of the
subject is best observed in the effect that subconscious or subtle
cues may have on the hypnotized subject. One commentator
maintains that
such suggestions cannot be avoided. The suggestive instructions and cues
provided to the subject need not be, and often are not, verbal. The attitude,
demeanor, and expectations of the hypnotist, his tone of voice, and his body
language may all communicate suggestive messages to the subject. Especially
powerful as an agent of suggestion is the context and purpose of the hyp-
notic session. Most hypnotic subjects aim to please.2 2
This "aim to please" may lead the subject to confabulate or
fantasize to fill in memory gaps with "facts" of which he actually
has no memory.23 These gaps may be filled in with information
which is untrue though reasonable in light of the subject's past
experience, actual memory of surrounding details, 2 4 and percep-
tion of what the hypnotist desires to hear. An example of such
confabulation is the use of hypnotic age regression to aid a subject
in "remembering" the future. Thus, a deeply hypnotized individ-
ual may be induced into giving a detailed account of what "oc-
curred" in the distant future if given the proper suggestion.2
Another problem in using hypnosis to jog a witness's memory
is the possibility of deliberate lying by a self-interested witness 20
Self-interest, unrelated to guilt, may arise merely out of pressure
from police and family to recall the details of a crime, and may
result in the hypnotized subject deliberately lying in a convincing
manner.27 Paradoxically, this deception may be "honest in the
sense that the subject is not aware that he is fabricating."2 When
considered with the fact that even an expert hypnotist cannot dis-
21. Dilloff, supra note 17, at 4; Spector & Foster, Admissibility of Hypnotic Statements: Is
the Law of Evidence Susceptible?, 38 OHIo ST. L.J. 567, 591 (1977).
22. Diamond, supra note 1, at 333. See also Dilloff, supra note 17, at 4, 7; Spector &
Foster, supra note 21, at 578, 591-93; Orne, The Use and Misuse of Hypnosis in Court, 27
INT'L J. OF CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 311, 328-31 (1979).
23. Orne, supra note 22, at 314, 317; Diamond, supra note 1, at 335; Spector & Fos-
ter, supra note 21, at 577, 588; Dilloff, supra note 17, at 4.
24. Orne, supra note 22, at 317; Spector & Foster, supra note 21, at 588.
25. Orne, supra note 22, at 321-22.
26. Orne, supra note 22, at 313; Diamond, supra note 1, at 330; Spector & Foster,
supra note 21, at 594; Dilloff, supra note 17, at 6.
27. Orne, supra note 22, at 314.
28. Diamond, supra note 1, at 330.
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tinguish a simulated hypnotic state from a real one,29 this effect is
disturbing. The resulting risk of either inadvertent or intentional
deception is significant.
A closely related and observed trait of the hypnotized subject
is a curious loss of critical judgment with respect to his own mem-
ory. Dr. Martin T. Orne, a prominent authority on the subject of
hypnosis,30 explains that hypnosis allows a person to accept "ap-
proximations of memory as accurate" though in the "wake state
he is unwilling to consider approximate or fragmentary memories
as acceptable recall." 31 Since the subject's threshold for what is
acceptably accurate memory to allow recall is lowered, he will pre-
sent more information than in the normal waking state, although
itf ma be clearly inaccurate. 2 In addition, due to this enhanced
confidence, the subject readily is willing to speculate on questions
to which he would normally give at best a tentative response.33
This factor of increased confidence has properly been an im-
portant concern of state courts.3 4 Since juries frequently use the
subtleties of body language, hesitation in response, and expres-
sions of doubt to measure the certainty and credibility of a wit-
ness, 35 this altering of confidence level may prove to be a substan-
29. This difficulty in distinguishing real from simulated hypnosis results from a lack of
any objective scientific criteria on which to make the determination as to when a hypnotic
state has actually been induced. Diamond, supra note 1, at 337.
30. Martin Orne, M.D., Ph.D., is a professor of psychiatry at the University of Penn-
sylvania and an expert in the clinical and research aspects of the study of hypnosis. In
addition to the article cited supra note 22, he has authored numerous other publications
over the years on both his research and related legal aspects of the uses of hypnotic proce-
dures. He has testified as an expert on the reliability of hypnosis as a, memory-jogging
device in a number of criminal cases. See United States v. Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252 (E.D.
Mich. 1977); Peterson v. State, 448 N.E.2d 673, 677 (Ind. 1983); State v. Seager, 341
N.W.2d 420, 423, 431 (Iowa 1983). See also, e.g., State v. Hurd, 173 N.J. Super. 333, 414
A.2d 291 (Law Div. 1980), affd 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86, (1981). There Dr. Orne, as an
expert witness for the defense, suggested the procedural safeguards that were adopted by
the court. Id. at 363, 414 A.2d at 297.
31. Orne, supra note 22, at 319.
32. Id.
33. Orne, supra note 22, at 332; Diamond, supra note 1, at 339-40; Putnam, Hypnosis
and Distortions in Eyewitness Testimony, 27 INT'L J. OF CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS
437, 444 (1979).
34. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 65-66, 641 P.2d at 803-04, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 272; Hurd, 86
N.J. at 539, 432 A.2d at 93; State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Ct., 132 Ariz. at 185, 644 P.2d
at 1287; People v. Gonzalez, 108 Mich. App. 145, 156-57, 310 N.W.2d 306, 312 (1981),
affd, 415 Mich. 615, 329 N.W.2d 743 (1982).
35. Diamond, supra note 1, at 339.
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tial obstacle to effective cross-examination by defense counsel.
The potential for abuse is clear in the case of a witness telling
varying stories over time. By reviewing events while under hypno-
sis, the credibility of the witness may be enhanced, although prior
to hypnosis his credibility would easily have been undermined by
cross-examination." The witness "becomes quite impervious to
such efforts, repeating one particular version of his story with
great conviction. 537
Another effect incident to this loss of critical judgment is the
inability of the subject to distinguish facts recalled prior to hypno-
sis from those recalled solely as a result of the hypnotic session.38
This occurs when the subject receives a post-hypnotic suggestion39
that after the hypnotic session he will remember facts he was pre-
viously unable to recall, a technique used frequently in criminal
investigations. 40 The subject then fills in gaps in his memory about
which he was previously uncertain. After the session, since he
does not know when particular facts were recalled, he may believe
that his recall of the entire event came about through normal
waking memory.41 This confusion of memory source is also im-
mune from challenge by cross-examination before the jury.42
Both of these effects incident to the general loss of critical
36. Orne, supra note 22, at 332-33. See, e.g., State v. Long, 32 Wash. App. 732, 649
P.2d 845, 847 (1982) (subjecting witness to "improper hypnotic episode" deprived the de-
fendant of a material witness and thus was reversible error).
37. Orne, supra note 22, at 332.
38. Diamond, supra note 1, at 337-38; Orne, supra note 22, at 320; Putnam, supra
note 33, at 437, 446.
39. Posthypnotic suggestions are given to a subject during hypnosis to induce compli-
ance with the particular suggestion in the waking state subsequent to the hypnotic session.
For a general discussion of this technique, see Spector & Foster, supra note 21, at 572-73.
Ethically the use of a posthypnotic suggestion in this manner is preferable to the use of
hypnotic age regression since the latter technique causes the subject to actually "relive" the
trauma of being a victim or witness of crime.
40. Orne, supra note 22, at 320.
41. Id.
42. Dr. Orne writes:
Even though prior to hypnosis he had been very uncertain about his memory,
had changed his story many times, and had not reported many of the details
that emerged only during hypnosis, he now will report his "memories" consist-
ently and with conviction. As a consequence memories which occurred only
during hypnosis may be incorrectly presented in court as though they repre-
sented recollections based on original memory traces of the events that actually
occurred on the day in question.
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judgment are even greater obstacles to insuring the reliability of
the witness's testimony than they first appear in light of the fact
that even experts are unable to detect them. The expert is unable
to determine if the subject is simulating the hypnotic state43 or if
any particular piece of memory is actual fact or mere confabula-
tion.44 If those knowledgeable in the field can't detect falsity or
distortion in hypnotically refreshed testimony,45 a juror would un-
doubtedly find the task impossible.
In contrast to these empirically demonstrated effects of hyp-
nosis on human memory is the generally held laymen's view that
hypnosis is a proven, reliable technique for unlocking previously
hidden memories in accurate form.46 Thus, a jury informed that
the testimony of a calm and confident witness was hypnotically in-
duced may be unduly influenced by the testimony. Courts adopt-
ing all three approaches considered in this Comment have ex-
pressed concern over this potential undue influence.'7
Accordingly, each has eliminated the risk of undue influence by
opting for a determination of admissibility as a matter of law prior
to trial, either by a per se rule,4 8 a case-by-case approach,49 or the
43. Diamond, supra note 1, at 337; Dilloff, supra note 15, at 6.
44. Diamond, supra note 1, at 337. Dr. Orne states that ". .. even a psychologist or
psychiatrist with extensive training in the field of hypnosis" cannot make this distinction.
Orne, supra note 22, at 318.
45. See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 1, at 340 (arguing that the best experts can do is
speculate on the probability of accurate and reliable recall).
46. Dr. Elizabeth Loftus suggests that this widely held belief may result from public
response to widely publicized instances of successful recall of additional facts by the use of
hypnosis. E. Lov-rus, supra note 18, at 57. Regardless of source, generally all commentators
acknowledge the fallacy of this widely held view. Diamond, supra note 1; Dilloff, supra note
17, at 5, 9; Orne, supra note 22, at 321; Spector & Foster, supra note 21, at 595, 596.
This myth relies on the erroneous permanence or "videotape" theory of memory. Dr.
Loftus reports that approximately three-fourths of those replying in an informal survey
revealed a belief that everything learned or observed was permanently stored in the mind,
and that inaccessible details could eventually be discovered through hypnosis or some other
special technique. E. Lovrus, supra note 18, at 42-43. Dr. Loftus and other commentators
all agree that this permanence theory of memory is inaccurate. Rather, memory is a con-
structive and changing process where many items are permanently lost. Id. at 41-45; Orne,
supra note 22, at 321. See also the California Supreme Court's discussion of theories of
memory in Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 57-62, 641 P.2d at 798-801, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 266-70.
47. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d at 543, 453 N.E.2d at 494, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 265; Shirley, 31
Cal. 3d at 51, 641 P.2d at 794, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 262; Hurd, 86 N.J. at 542-43, 432 A.2d at
91 (recognizing the potential for undue influence on the layman juror but expressing faith
in the adversary system as a means to inform the jury, thus avoiding the problem).
48. See, e.g., Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d at 804, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 272-73.
49. E.g., Hurd, 86 N.J. at 525, 432 A.2d at 86.
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hybrid propounded in People v. Hughes. The application of hyp-
notic techniques to criminal investigations clearly warrants such a
determination in light of the inherent unreliability of hypnosis as
a memory-jogging device. A more time-tested procedure fully un-
derstood by laymen would make such caution less necessary.
B. The Utility of Hypnotic Procedures, Past and Present
In contrast to its traditional uses in other fields, the increasing
use of hypnosis in forensic contexts is a relatively recent trend.
Hypnosis has been used successfully in psychotherapy to treat
both mental and emotional disorders.50 In medicine it has been
used to treat psychosomatic disorders51 and to anesthetize pa-
tients.5 2 Perhaps its oldest use is as a source of entertainment in
the theatre and circus.53 The foregoing medical and psychiatric
uses, first viewed as proper subjects for research in the immediate
post-World War II period,5' have gained widespread acceptance
in their respective scientific fields in recent years. In contrast, the
use of hypnosis to enhance accurate recall of events forgotten in
the normal waking state has been consistently rejected as unrelia-
ble in the scientific and legal literature.55 The characteristics of a
previously hypnotized subject with respect to his newfound recall
of prior events discussed above support this general rejection of
this latter use of hypnosis.
However, despite the inherent problems of unreliability and
its detection, all commentators agree that hypnotic procedures are
useful in retrieving increased amounts of information from a wit-
ness previously unable to remember specific details of an event. 50
50. Diamond, supra note 1, at 320.
51. Dilloff, supra note 17, at 3; Spector & Foster, supra note 21, at 579.
52. Dilloff, supra note 17, at 3; Spector & Foster, supra note 21, at 579.
53. Dilloff, supra note 17, at 3; Diamond, supra note 1, at 320.
54. This was due to the increased therapeutic use of hypnosis after World War II to
treat war neurosis. Diamond, supra note 1, at 320. In addition to these more traditional
uses, there is some empirical evidence suggesting that visual imagery hypnosis may be an
effective means to achieve breast enlargement. See Willard, Breast Enlargement Through Vis-
ual Imagery and Hypnosis, 19 Am. J. CLINICAL HYPNOSIS 195 (1977); Staib & Logan, Hypnotic
Stimulation of Breast Growth, 19 AM. J. CLINICAL HYPNOSIS 201 (1977).
55. See generally E. Los-rus, supra note 18,at 57; Diamond, supra note 1; Orne, supra
note 22; Putnam, supra note 33;
56. Spector & Foster state: "The value of hypnosis lies in its scientifically-established
reliability as a device for retrieving relevant testimony previously forgotten or psychologi-
cally suppressed, regardless of the factual truth or falsity of that testimony." Spector & Fos-
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So long as the assumption that this information is truthful and
accurate is avoided, 57 hypnosis may be useful in obtaining objec-
tive facts as potential leads to be further investigated.5
Thus in the difficult case where there are no suspects, wit-
nesses to the crime are traumatized, and little or no other evi-
dence is available, the investigatory use of hypnosis appears appro-
priate to induce recall of details which may lead to other
admissible evidence.59 An oft-cited example of such use is to re-
trieve a potentially useful license plate number on an unidentified
vehicle connected with a crime.60 Reported instances where simi-
lar leads have proven fruitful are many.61 However, as at least one
ter, supra note 21, at 584 (emphasis original). See also Diamond, supra note 1, at 337; Orne,
supra note 22, at 318.
57. The retrieved details may be truthful or totally false. Orne, supra note 22, at 318.
58. Id.
59. See State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Ct., 132 Ariz. 180, 192, 644 P.2d 1266, 1278
(1982) where Chief Justice Holohan, in dissent, applied a similar analysis in arguing strenu-
ously that the per se rule, practically precluding such use of hypnosis, went too far.
Though courts have not made such a fact pattern a prerequisite for their approval of the
use of hypnosis to refresh a witness's recall, most cases where it is utilized are of this type.
For an exception, see Commonwealth v. Taylor, 294 Pa. Super. 171, 439 A.2d 805 (1982).
There the victim of a brutal rape had had her throat slit in the course of the attack. At the
crime scene she identified the location of one of the defendants, though she could not
speak, by pointing in the direction of the house next door, where the defendant lived.
Later, at the hospital, she made a positive photo identification of the first defendant, subse-
quently bolstered by a line-up identification of the second defendant. Id. at 807-08. All
three identifications were made before hypnosis was used. The court ridiculed the police
for invoking hypnosis where the victim had present recollection of her assailants, thereby
jeopardizing the admissibility of her testimony and a conviction for this heinous crime. Id.
at 807 n.2.
60. For example, in the infamous Chowchilla kidnapping case of 1976, twenty-six chil-
dren and their school bus driver were abducted. While under hypnosis, the bus driver, who
had earlier fled his captors, recalled accurately all but one number of the license plate on
the van involved in the crime. This lead in the investigation eventually resulted in the
solution of the crime. Orne, supra note 22, at 318.
61. After the 1973 Nahariya-Haifa bus bombing by terrorists, the Israeli National Po-
lice questioned the driver to no avail about his recall of any suspicious passengers. Under
hypnosis the driver recalled one rider on the bus carrying a brown paper package. This
lead eventually led to the apprehension of those responsible. E. LoFrus, supra note 18, at
55.
Another interesting case involved the abduction of two young girls, ages seven and
fifteen, in San Francisco. The girls were taken to Mexico by car where the older girl was
repeatedly raped before both were released a few days later. The initial investigation re-
trieved little information from the girls due to their traumatized states of mind. Under
hypnosis the older girl recalled specific rust spots on the defendant's car, specifics about
boxes of cookies and tissues on the back seat of the car, and a San Diego gas station where
the defendant had stopped for car repairs. She recalled conversations between the attend-
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commentator has pointed out, for each anecdotal instance of suc-
cess there are many cases where retrieved "facts" only resulted in
dead ends after subsequent investigation. 2
Clearly, independent verification is necessary to confirm the
historical accuracy of details recalled only under hypnosis. 3 Only
after each fact is verified can the dangers of unreliability and sug-
gestibility be minimized. However, facts such as license plate num-
bers, identified as the same by individuals with adequate eyesight
and easily verified with minimal intrusion into the lives of poten-
tially innocent persons, are of a much different nature than hyp-
notically refreshed eyewitness identifications. With the latter, the
unreliability due to hypnosis is compounded by uncertainty result-
ing from the normal subjective perceptions of the witness.6 4 Thus
ant and the defendant, the nature of the repairs, and that the repairs were paid for by
credit card. She stated that the air conditioning didn't work since it needed "freon," utter-
ing the word in an inquisitive tone. This was explained by the fact that she had never
heard this word before. A trace through the gas station and credit card transaction quickly
resulted in an arrest of the suspect and his eventual conviction. Koger & Douc6, Forensic
Uses of Hypnosis, 23 Am. J. CLINICAL HYPNosIs 86, 91-92 (1980).
62. Though acknowledging the success of the use of hypnosis in the Chowchilla case,
see supra note 60, Dr. Orne states: "On the other hand, a good many license plate numbers
that have been recalled under hypnosis by witnesses in other cases in fact belonged to
individuals where it turned out, after investigation, that neither they nor their cars could
have been involved." Orne, supra note 20, at 318.
63. Id. However, Dr. Diamond points out that independent verification does not nec-
essarily insure the reliability of hypnotically retrieved statements since the statements may
still be the product of inadvertent suggestion by the hypnotist. Diamond, supra note 1, at
338. Simply stated, the corroborative or independent source may actually be the initial
source of the evidentiary material. This slight qualification of Dr. Orne's assertion that
independent verification may insure reliability is of little practical importance. If criminal
investigators already possessed a positive identification of a suspect or an incriminating li-
cense plate number, the issue of invoking hypnosis might never arise in the first instance.
64. See generally, Buckhout, Eyewitness Testimony, 231 Sci. AM., Dec. 1974, at 23, 25-26;
Starkman, The Use of Eyewitness Identification Evidence at Criminal Trials, 21 CRIM. L.Q. 361
(1979). See also Karlin, Forensic Hypnosis-Two Case Reports: A Brief Communication, 31 INT'L
J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 227 (1983). There the author reviewed two crimi-
nal cases where, despite the fact that a significant amount of confabulation affected the
recall of hypnotized witnesses, the prosecutors were willing to try the defendants on the
sole evidentiary basis of hypnotically aided eyewitness identifications. The author's displea-
sure is noted as follows:
I have served as an expert for both the prosecution and the defense in hyp-
nosis cases. I am sure that both prosecutors in the above two cases were well
intentioned. Nevertheless, the cause of justice was not well served by the use of
hypnosis to "refresh recollection" in either instance. This suggests to me that
the great care which one must take in the forensic use of hypnosis must be
redoubled when hypnosis is used to obtain an eyewitness identification of the
perpetrator. It also suggests, to the degree that such anecdotes can, that exclud-
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it appears that the use of the license plate number as a lead to
further investigation poses less of a threat to traditional values of
fairness than does the use of hypnotically-aided eyewitness
identification.
II. HYPNOTICALLY REFRESHED TESTIMONY AND CRIMINAL TRIALS:
THE Shirley AND Hurd APPROACHES
The foregoing analysis of the inherent problems of hypnosis
when used as a memory-jogging device provides a basic founda-
tion for evaluating the three approaches to the issue of the admis-
sibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony prevalent in recent
case law.
A. The Shirley Approach
The per se inadmissibility rule is best exemplified by the posi-
tion taken by the California Supreme Court in People v. Shirley."5
There the complainant alleged that she was raped in her apart-
ment. The defendant claimed that she had consented. The com-
plainant generally testified that the defendant had forced her to
commit sexual intercourse and oral copulation, the former while
gagged and bound.6 The defendant testified that the complainant
had invited him to her apartment earlier that evening while both
were in the bar where she worked.67 He claimed he went by,
knocked on the door, and later called through a screen door after
hearing sounds suggesting the complainant was ill inside the
apartment.6 8 He stated that he entered through the front door
ing "hypnotically refreshed" testimony may be the least of the evils available to
our courts in this regard.
Id. at 233.
The enhanced unreliability of hypnotically refreshed testimony with respect to eyewit-
ness identifications has led a few courts to adopt a narrow per se rule only applied to such
identifications. See, e.g., United States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196, 1203 (5th Cir. 1984)
("when, as here, a hypnotized subject identifies for the first time a person he has reason to
know is already under suspicion, the post-hypnotic testimony is inadmissible whatever pro-
cedural safeguards were used to attempt to sanitize the hypnotic session.") The result in
Valdez is more similar to Hughes than Shirley since the witness may testify to an identifica-
tion made prior to hypnosis.
65. 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982).
66. Id. at 24-25, 641 P.2d at 777, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 245-46.
67. Id. at 27, 641 P.2d at 779, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
68. Id. at 28, 641 P.2d at 779, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 247-48.
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after she opened it and engaged in intercourse with her only after
she made certain advances toward him. He denied breaking in
and using any force. 9 Investigators invoked hypnosis in an at-
tempt to resolve these discrepancies. The complainant was hypno-
tized more than three months after the disputed events.7 0 At trial
her testimony contradicted statements made on two previous occa-
sions with respect to a number of details.7 1 The defendant was
convicted of rape and unlawful entry with intent to commit a fel-
ony, based primarily on the alleged victim's testimony.7 2
On appeal, in a lengthy decision authored by Justice Mosk,
the California Supreme Court held that a witness or victim who
has undergone hypnosis prior to trial is incompetent to testify to
matters which were the subject of the pretrial session. The court
did impose certain limitations on the rule. The rule does not ap-
ply to a defendant choosing to testify at trial or to subject matter
outside the scope of the hypnotic session. Additionally, the court
expressly endorsed the proper use of hypnosis for investigative
purposes.7 3
The Shirley decision included a brief discussion of the fifteen
year evolution of case law on the issue of the admissibility of hyp-
notically refreshed recall.7' The court noted the early tendency of
state courts to admit such testimony at trial and allow the jury to
evaluate the credibility of the witness, an approach characterized
by lack of judicial consideration of the inherent unreliability of
hypnotically induced recall. By the late 1970's a number of state
69. Id., 641 P.2d at 780, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 247-48.
70. Id. at 29, 641 P.2d at 780, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
71. At trial she testified that she awoke on the couch and was forced to strip in the
bedroom. She also testified that the act of oral copulation preceded sexual intercourse and
that her hands were not tied during the former act. In addition, she testified that she saw
the defendant's knife for the first time when she awoke on the couch.
Her accounts of these details were in sharp contrast to the descriptions she gave of
them on two occasions prior to hypnosis. Earlier, she stated that she had fallen asleep on
the couch, only to awake naked, gagged, and bound in the bedroom, and that the defen-
dant had sexual intercourse with her before and after oral copulation. She also stated that
her hands were tied during oral copulation. Finally, she initially contended that the first
time she saw the knife was after returning to the living room, after sexual intercourse. Id.
at 30, 641 P.2d at 777, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 249.
72. Id. at 23 n.1, 641 P.2d at 776, n.1, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 245 n.l.
73. Id. at 67-68, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 273. An earlier version of Shirley appears at 641
P.2d 775 but does not contain the portion of the opinion cited here.
74. Id. at 35-51, 641 P.2d at 784-94, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 252-63.
75. Id. at 36, 641 P.2d at 785, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 253. For a discussion of this early
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courts had taken notice of this unreliability. These courts applied
the standard of whether such testimony was generally accepted as
reliable in the scientific community relevant to the inquiry. 6 Find-
trend and its subsequent fall from grace, see supra note 15.
76. This standard of "general acceptance," commonly known as the Frye standard, was
originally proposed in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The standard
has received wide acceptance in state and federal courts as the proper test of admissibility
for evidence produced by novel scientific techniques. See, e.g., Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374,
381-89, 391 A.2d 364, 368-72 (1978) (Frye standard applied to voiceprint analysis). How-
ever, the standard has been criticized by commentators both generally as an approach to
novel scientific evidence and in its application to forensic hypnosis. See, e.g., Gianelli, The
Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence-Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM.
L. REv. 1197, 1208-19 (1980) (problems in applying Frye standard include lack of clarity
with respect to what is the relevant field which must assess reliability, what degree of ac-
ceptance is "general" acceptance, what must be generally accepted (procedures or theory
underlying production of the evidence), and what constitutes "scientific evidence"); Mc-
Cormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility, 67 IowA L. REV. 879,
908-11 (1982) (advocating rejection of Frye in favor of traditional balancing approach of
probative value against the risk of prejudice, confusion of issues, and consumption of trial
resources); Note, Pretrial Hypnosis and Its Effect on Witness Competency in Criminal Trials, 62
NEB. L. REv. 336, 351-53 (1983) (Frye test inappropriately applied to hypnotically induced
testimony since witness's knowledge of events in question determines competence, not reli-
ability, and thus the former should be emphasized); see also Brown v. State, 426 So. 2d 76,
87-88 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (rejecting Frye as proper standard to be applied to eyewit-
ness testimony refreshed by hypnosis).
Besides hypnotically refreshed testimony, the standard has been invoked to determine
the admissibility of numerous other types of evidence produced by forensic "scientific"
techniques.
One of the more publicized forensic techiques to which the standard has been applied is
the testing of truth and deception by means of the polygraph. The polygraph measures the
deceptiveness of a subject's response to a series of questions by closely monitoring blood
pressure, pulse rates, respiration rate and depth, and galvanic skin response. See Annot. 53
A.L.R. 3d 1005, 1007. Polygraph results have been estimated to be as low as 70% accurate.
See Burkey, The Case Against the Polygraph, 51 A.B.A. J. 855, 856 (1965). Other commenta-
tors have estimated the percent accuracy of the polygraph to be significantly higher. See F.
INBAU & J. READ, LIE DErEcTION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 111 (3d ed. rev. & enlarged
1953) (claiming 95% accuracy in the hands of skilled operator). Commentators agree that a
major factor in achieving reliable results is the skill and experience of the examiner. See
Note, The Role of the Polygraph in OurJudicial System, 20 S.C.L. REv. 804, 816 (1968). Other
key factors include the proper functioning of the.apparatus anil the mental and emotional
state of the witness. Despite their asserted reliability, as a general rule the results of lie
detector tests are inadmissible absent a stipulation by the parties. 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence §
831 (1967). This is due to the lack of general scientific recognition as to the reliability of
polygraph results. See, e.g., Henderson v. State, 95 Okla. Crim. 45, 230 P.2d 495, cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 898 (1951) (polygraph has not gained scientific recognition or accuracy
necessary to establish admissibility); State v. Chavez, 80 N.M. 786, 461 P.2d 919 (1969)
(polygraph results not admissible over objection even if parties stipulated to admissibility
prior to the examination).
However, as Professor Gianelli has noted, a stipulation freely entered into by both par-
ties to a criminal proceeding may circumvent the requirement of general acceptance as
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ing that hypnotically refreshed testimony did not meet this test,
reliable within the scientific community. Gianelli, supra, at 1221 n.185. See also State v.
Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962) (admissible at discretion of trial judge if stipula-
tion signed by defendant and both counsel and if proper foundation laid); People v. Davis,
270 Cal. App. 2d 841, 76 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1969) (though normally inadmissible may stipu-
late to admissibility beforehand). Other courts require both a stipulation and other more
stringent conditions to be met before the polygraph is admitted. See State v. Forgan, 104
Ariz. 497, 455 P.2d 975 (1969) (probative value sufficient if stipulation as to admissibility
signed by all parties, examiner qualified, and test conducted under proper conditions);
State v. McDavitt, 62 N.J. 36, 297 A.2d 849 (1972) (polygraph sufficiently reliable if clear,
unequivocal, and complete stipulation, freely entered into by defendant with full
knowledge of right to refuse, examiner qualified, test administered according to established
techniques, and jury instructed that polygraph results not directly probative on issue of
guilt or innocence); State v. Ross, 7 Wash. App. 62, 497 P.2d 1343 (1972). Why such a
stipulation makes polygraph results more "reliable" is unclear.
Another scientific technique commonly used in the forensic context is the "truth se-
rum" interview, used to induce a subject to freely give previously inhibited responses to
questions. Most cases in this area deal with the extent to which an expert witness can testify
as to the results of a "truth serum" test. A number of cases have allowed the psychiatrist-
expert to testify to his opinion based on the results of the test, that an examination took
place, and the nature of the examination, but do not allow hearsay testimony on the actual
statements made by the subject during the session. See, e.g., People v. Hiser, 267 Cal. App.
2d 47, 72 Cal. Rptr. 906 (1968); People v. Myers, 35 I11. 2d 311, 220 N.E.2d 297, cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1019 (1966); People v. Seipel, 108 Ill. App. 2d 334, 247 N.E.2d 905, cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 1057 (1969). A rare few cases have admitted testimony of an expert as to
statements made by a subject during the test or an actual recording of the statements
themselves. See, e.g., Lemmon v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., 9 Utah 2d
195, 341 P.2d 215 (1959) (civil case admitting testimony of psychiatrist as to conversation
under sodium amytal); People v. Cartier, 51 Cal. 2d 590, 335 P.2d 114 (1959) (In Bank)
(reversible error to exclude tape recorded interview under sodium pentothal when offered
to support opinion as to sanity of defendant), affd, 54 Cal. 2d 300, 353 P.2d 53, 5 Cal.
Rptr. 573 (1960). More frequently such tapes or recordings are excluded due to reliability
concerns of the court. See, e.g., People v. Cox, 85 Mich. App. 314, 271 N.W.2d 216 (1978).
The Frye standard has also been applied to identifications by spectrographic voiceprint
analysis. The early cases in this area excluded such an identification as not having gained
general acceptance as reliable in the relevant scientific field. See People v. King, 266 Cal.
App. 2d 437, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1968); see also State v. Cary, 49 N.J. 343, 230 A.2d 384
(1967). A few years later, after significant research into the reliability of voiceprint evi-
dence was conducted, a number of courts found that this technique did meet the require-
ments of Frye, and thus the evidence was admissible. See Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367
Mass. 191, 327 N.E.2d 671 (1975); Hodo v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App. 3d 778, 106 Cal.
Rptr. 547 (1973). However, the tendency of the legal community to lag behind scientific
research in altering its analysis under the Frye standard, and perhaps the ambiguity of the
standard itself, is suggested by more recent cases asserting that voiceprint identification
does not meet the general acceptance requirement. See, e.g., United States v. Addison, 498
F.2d 741, 745 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (spectrographic voiceprint identification of defendant as
maker of phone call not admissible); People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 32, 549 P.2d 1240,
1251, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 149 (1976) (record in instant case insufficient to support reliabil-
ity of voiceprint evidence). See also Gianelli, supra at 1224-25 n.212 (discussion of decisions
rejecting reliability of gunshot "paraffin" test).
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these cases generally held such testimony inadmissible at criminal
trials." The Shirley court accepted the application of this standard
as the better reasoned means of resolving the issue.78
Applying the "general acceptance" standard requires review
of the opinions of experts in the relevant scientific community.
The court noted that the only major proponent of the use of hyp-
nosis to aid witness recall 9 relies on the premise that memory is
like a videotape machine, recording and permanently storing each
visual stimulus. In theory, this "recording" is then replayed accu-
rately when the subject is hypnotized. 0 After reviewing extensive
scientific literature on human memory, the Shirley court found
that this videotape theory of memory has been overwhelmingly
rejected in the research community."1 In addition, the court
found that "each of the phenomena found by such research to
contribute to the unreliability of normal memory reappears in a
more extreme form when the witness is hypnotized for the pur-
Neutron activation analysis to determine trace elements in minute samples of a sub-
stance has also been subjected to scrutiny under the Frye test. In State v. Coolidge, 109
N.H. 403, 260 A.2d 547 (1969), rev'd, 403 U.S. 443, reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 874 (1970),
identification of hair samples by this technique was properly excluded under Frye. By 1971,
use of this technique to detect hair samples was found to be generally accepted as reliable
in the relevant scientific community. See State v. Stevens, 467 S.W.2d 10, 23 (Mo. 1971).
Another forensic technique subjected to scrutiny under the Frye standard is identification
by bitemark comparison. See, e.g., People v. Milone, 43 Ill. App. 3d 385, 397-98, 356
N.E.2d 1350, 1351-60 (1976) (dental bitemark comparison admissible; Frye does not re-
quire unanimity); People v. Marx, 54 Cal. App. 3d 100, 111, 126 Cal. Rptr. 350, 356
(1975). For a list of cases concerning the array of other forensic techniques to which Frye
has been applied, see Gianelli, supra, at 1206 n.54.
77. 31 Cal. 3d at 41-51, 641 P.2d at 787-94, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 256-63.
78. Id. at 51-54, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 262-65. For the California adaptation of the general
acceptance standard, see People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 31-32, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244, 130
Cal. Rptr. 144, 148-49 (1976). In Kelly, the court expressly defined the primary purpose of
the general acceptance standard as preventing the jury from being misled by unproven and
ultimately unsound scientific methods. Id. at 31, 32, 549 P.2d at 1245, 130 Cal. Rptr. at
140.
79. Martin Reiser, head of the Los Angeles Police Department's behavioral sciences
services, believes that investigatory hypnosis is a field distinct from therapeutic hypnosis,
and that police personnel passing his four day course become eminently qualified to admin-
ister hypnosis in the forensic context. See Holden, Forensic Use of Hypnosis on Increase, 208
Sci. 1443, 1443-44 (1980). However, this distinction between the fields of therapeutic and
investigatory hypnosis, and the "videotape" theory of memory which Reiser's approach
relies on have been largely discredited by the experts. Id. at 1444.
80. 31 Cal. 3d at 57, 641 P.2d at 798, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 266.
81. Id. at 61, 641 P.2d at 800-01, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 269.
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pose of improving his recollection." 2
Specific effects of hypnosis noted by the Shirley court include
hypersuggestibility,8 3 the tendency to confabulate, 4 and the ten-
dency to mix true memories with concocted ones.", A primary
concern of the Shirley court was the increased confidence of an
initially uncertain witness in reporting his recollection after hyp-
nosis. When combined with the inability to determine the source
of enhanced recall of details, this phenomenon leads a subject to
believe his memory is clear and accurate. As such, the Shirley
court observed, the traditional means for revealing the uncer-
tainty of a witness-cross-examination-is rendered totally inef-
fective. 6 The review of scientific authorities, consistent with the
views of the defense expert testifying at the trial level, led the
court to conclude that the general acceptance standard had not
been met and that the per se inadmissibility rule was appropri-
ate.' As such, the denial of the defendent's motion to exclude
was reversible error.88
The per se rule embraces the highest possible judicial con-
cern for problems of inaccuracy and potential undue influence on
the jury of hypnotically induced recall. Though this recognition is
commendable in light of the early case law admitting such evi-
dence with little analysis,' the rule has its shortcomings.
B. Critique of Shirley
First, the rule of Shirley is overinclusive in practical applica-
tion to certain cases where hypnosis is utilized. Often a witness
will recall certain sporadic details of an event prior to hypnosis or
experience a block in memory for an interval of time, though re-
membering events immediately before and after this period. This
82. Id. at 63, 641 P.2d at 802, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 270.
83. Id. at 63-64, 641 P.2d at 802, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 271.
84. Id. at 64, 641 P.2d at 802-03, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 271.
85. Id. at 65, 641 P.2d at 803, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 271-72.
86. Id. at 66, 641 P.2d at 803-04, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 272.
87. Id., 641 P.2d at 804, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 272-73.
88. After showing reversible error, the defendant had the burden of showing
prejudice. Since the sole incriminating evidence against the defendant was the complain-
ant's testimony, the prejudicial error test was met and the conviction overturned. Id. at 68-
70, 641 P.2d at 806, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 274-75.
89. See supra note 15.
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material, clearly relevant0 and normally admissible as the product
of normal memory, becomes inadmissible assuming the hypnotist
makes the sequence of details surrounding the criminal event the
subject of the hypnotic session.
A second shortcoming concerns the inevitable tainting of this
evidence under the Shirley rule should hypnosis be invoked. As a
result the rule places a difficult strategy decision before law en-
forcement authorities at an early stage in a criminal investiga-
tion. Assuming consent, investigators may hypnotize a witness in
the hope of gaining access to objective facts leading to significant
progress in their investigation. Of course, the price of this strat-
egy is the loss of the witness's testimony at trial. In the alternative,
investigators may decide against hypnosis in the hope that other
means of investigation will prove fruitful, thereby preserving the
witness's limited or uncertain recall for trial.
The typical case where this choice is necessary is where a vio-
lent crime results in a witness whose memory is blocked by
trauma,9 2 where no positive identification of a suspect has been
made, and where the police have few leads. Public pressure to
solve such a crime may be considerable. Thus, the efficacy of put-
ting such a choice in the hands of law enforcement authorities,
90. Ruffra, Hypnotically Induced Testimony: Should It Be Admitted?, 19 CRIM. L. BULL. 293,
321 (1983).
91. Beaver, Memory Restored or Confabulated by Hypnosis-Is it Competent? 6 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REv. 155, 203 (1983). Professor Beaver takes notice of the difficult decision the
police must make, but he then suggests that making a deposition of the pre-hypnotic state-
ments of a witness may solve the difficulty. Id. at 204. Presumably such a deposition might
be read in evidence as past recollection recorded. However, the Shirley court made no ex-
ception for such use of a deposition, holding that the testimony of a witness or victim
subjected to pretrial hypnosis was inadmissible as to all matters which were the subject of
the hypnotic session. It is doubtful that prosecutors in hypnosis cases would be successful
using such a deposition in this manner since the primary incriminating evidence would be
read into the record, a much less effective means of presentation than testimony in person
before a jury. In addition, the deposition proposal fails to address the difficulty of judging
an essential witness's credibility and demeanor without the benefit of cross-examination,
precisely the concern of the Shirley court in the context of hypnotically refreshed
testimony.
92. One exception to the general observation that investigations invoking hypnosis are
violent crimes where the witness in question is traumatized or suffering from blocked mem-
ory is Brown v. State, 426 So. 2d 76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). There the defendant was
charged with forgery and grand theft for receiving and cashing the checks of a bankrupt
company. Not surprisingly, the bank teller's recollection of the transactions had faded in
the two year interim between commission of the crime and the trial. After a hypnotic ses-
sion the teller selected the defendant-suspect's picture from a group of photos. Id. at 77-78.
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unqualified to evaluate the many psychological variables 3 related
to the success of any prospective hypnosis and unable to know
what new evidence may be revealed, is dubious. While taking diffi-
cult determinations of reliability out of the hands of trial courts
and juries, the Shirley rule throws the equally difficult burden of
the aforementioned investigatory strategy decision into the laps of
law enforcement agencies.
Still a third weakness of the Shirley court approach, noted by
the court in Hughes,94 is the failure to extend the rule to its logical
conclusion in the case where a defendant chooses to testify in his
own behalf. The court limited the rule, stating "when it is the
defendant himself-not merely a defense witness-who submits
to potential hypnosis, the experience will not render his testimony
inadmissible if he elects to take the stand . . . ."' In this context
the court abandons its great concern for unreliability.
Clearly, protecting the defendant's fundamental right to be
heard 6 in this manner is susceptible to abuse. Defense counsel
confronted with a client with conflicting stories on different occa-
sions, or faint recollection of events during the alleged crime, may
utilize highly suggestive hypnotic procedures to clarify or even
construct his client's memory. This would significantly alter an
otherwise unconvincing presentation of the defendant's testimony.
Another potential misuse of this loophole is in the preparation of
a nervous or inexperienced defendant for trial.9 7 Though ethical-
93. Variables which may determine the likelihood of success in obtaining leads in any
prospective hypnosis include the hypnotizability of the particular subject and the psycho-
logical cause of the subject's memory loss. Spector & Foster, supra note 21, at 571-74
(describing the hypnotic state).
94. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d at 540, 453 N.E.2d at 492, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 263.
95. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 67, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 273. An earlier version of Shirley ap-
pears at 641 P.2d 775 but does not contain the portion of the opinion cited here.
96. The defendant's right to be heard at trial should he so choose is fundamental to a
fair trial. See, e.g., People v. Robles, 2 Cal. 3d 205, 215, 46 P.2d 710, 716, 85 Cal. Rptr.
166, 172 (1970) (defendant's right to take the stand is of such fundamental importance
that where the defendant insisted on doing so over the strenuous objections of his ap-
pointed counsel, the trial court acted properly in allowing him to testify).
97. Hypnosis has clearly been recognized as useful in polishing a witness's testimony in
this manner:
The second application of forensic hypnosis is in the preparation of a nervous
witness for examination in the witness box. Inexperienced witnesses are seldom
at their best in this situation, and under cross-examination may become so mud-
dled or forgetful that their evidence may lose value. The use of post-hypnotic
relaxation is one method of enabling the nervous witness to stand up to the
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ly more acceptable than use of hypnosis to alter a defendant's tes-
timony,9 this sanctioned use is not extended to the prosecution in
cases where witness accounts are inconsistent or the witness is
merely inexperienced or anxious. The failure of the Shirley court
to precisely define this limitation on the per se rule makes both
uses available to the defense regardless of the suggestibility of the
procedures employed. As one commentator suggests, clear defini-
tion of the scope of this exception and possibly a minimal stan-
dard of reliability may be proper to curb future abuse by defense
counsel of this gap in the law.99
The Shirley court expressly encourages the future legitimate
use of hypnosis to gain objective facts as leads to more traditional
evidence, implying that their adoption of the per se rule in no way
precludes such use."'0 In practical application, however, the deter-
rent effect of the per se rule may have just that effect. Assuming
again a violent crime, little evidence to go on, no positive identifi-
cation of a suspect, and a witness with limited memory of details,
law enforcement officials have no idea what type of details may
become available under hypnosis. The entire sequence of events
occurring in the witness's presence is reasonably the subject of any
prospective hypnotic session. However, under the Shirley rule such
an inquiry would make all the witness's prior recall inadmissible.
The disqualification of a key witness in this manner may be too
high a cost to pay for the potentially limited benefits hypnosis may
stress imposed by cross-examination and to give his evidence with maximum
effectiveness.
Haward & Ashworth, Some Problems of Evidence Obtained by Hypnosis, 1980 CRiM. L. REV.
469, 469-70.
98. Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(6) of the MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILTrY
(1979) states that a lawyer shall not "[p]articipate in the creation or preservation of evi-
dence when he knows or it is obvious that the evidence is false." Changing the substance of
a defendant's testimony through a suggestive hypnotic procedure would seemingly fall
clearly within the scope of this rule. Minimizing the nervous tendencies of a witness would
not, assuming counsel's belief in the truth of the witness's testimony.
99. One commentator suggests two alternative solutions to shore up this exception to
the per se rule:
The scope and extent of this "necessary exception" is not clearly defined. In
the future, the court could require that the defendant who wishes to testify
after being hypnotized make a showing of reliability or could conclude that
knowing voluntary submission to hynopsis constitutes a valid waiver of the right
to testify . . .
Ruffra, supra note 90, at 321.
100. 31 Cal. 3d at 67-68, 641 P.2d at 805, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 272.
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afford,' 0 1 especially if public sentiment for the apprehension and
conviction of the perpetrator is running high. At the same time
the rule creates a conflict between a crime victim's interest in ac-
cess to hypnosis for therapeutic reasons and his interest in being
heard at trial.
The basic problems in Shirley of overinclusiveness, of burden-
ing investigators with a nearly impossible investigation strategy
decision at an early stage following a crime, and of practical fore-
closure of the more legitimate investigative uses of hypnosis, have
not been overlooked by other state courts considering this issue.
State courts which had recently adopted the Shirley rule, either
expressly10 2 or implicitly,103 have since been reassessing the per se
rule. Realizing the utility and efficiency of hypnosis as an investi-
gative tool, state courts in Arizona,10 4 Pennsylvania,'"3  Michi-
gan, 06 and Minnesota 0 7 have recently qualified their versions of
101. State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 209-10, 644 P.2d 1266,
1295-96 (1982) (Feldman, J., supplemental opinion).
102. State v. La Mountain, 125 Ariz. 547, 551, 611 P.2d 551, 555 (1980); State v.
Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 624 P.2d 1274 (1981).
103. State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 771 (Minn. 1980) (neither defense nor prosecu-
tion witness whose memory was refreshed by hypnosis allowed to testify to matters recalled
under hypnosis); People v. Tait, 99 Mich. App. 19, 29, 297 N.W.2d 853, 857 (1980) (hold-
ing the victim-witness's testimony so tainted by hypnosis that it cannot be used at all on
retrial); Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 111,436 A.2d 170, 178 (1981) (hold-
ing that hypnotically refreshed testimony was inadmissible at criminal trials due to absence
of conclusive proof as to its reliability, despite the court's reluctance to adopt a per se rule
of inadmissability); Collins v. State, 52 Md. App. 186, 205-06, 447 A.2d 1272, 1283 (1982)
(hypnotically refreshed testimony inadmissible due to failure to meet the general accept-
ance test, though use for investigative purposes is permissible under strict guidelines as set
forth in State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1980)).
104. State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266 (1982). The
initial decision in Collins upheld the per se inadmissible rule over the dissent of Justice
Holohan, who suggested that pre-hypnotic statements preserved and untainted should be
admitted. Id. at 192-93, 644 P.2d at 1278-79 (Feldman, J., supplemental opinion). A mo-
tion for rehearing was granted by a reconstituted court and, in an extensive supplemental
opinion of May 2, 1982, the court held that hypnosis does not render a victim incompetent
to testify to facts demonstrably recalled prior to hypnosis. Id. at 209, 644 P.2d at 1295
(Feldman, J., supplemental opinion). The court found that the benefit of investigative hyp-
nosis far outweighs the danger to the defendant's right to confrontation and suggested that
cross-examination, expert testimony, a recording of the hypnotic session and procedures,
and timely disclosure of the use of hypnosis to the adversary party would minimize the risks
of tainting the pre-hypnotic recall. Id. at 210, 644 P.2d at 1296 (Feldman, J., supplemental
opinion).
105. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 294 Pa. Super. 171, 177-78, 439 A.2d 805, 808 (1982)
(an identification clearly established prior to hypnosis admissible).
106. People v. Wallach, 110 Mich. App. 37, 312 N.W.2d 387 (1981); People v. Gonza-
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the per se rule, stating that pretrial hypnosis does not necessarily
render inadmissible the testimony of a witness as to matters recal-
led prior to hypnosis. Whether the California Supreme Court will
take a similar step back is uncertain, though it has been suggested
by at least one commentator.0 8
C. The Case-by-Case Approach: State v. Hurd
In sharp contrast to Shirley is the view that a witness subjected
to hypnosis before trial may testify to matters recalled both before
and after hypnosis so long as certain procedures designed to mini-
mize the risk of unreliability are complied with in administering
the hypnosis. This approach is best exemplified by the decision of
the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Hurd.109 As in Shirley,
the court there make no distinction in its policy with respect to
pre-hypnotic and post-hypnotic recall. Also similar to Shirley, the
facts in Hurd typify the type of case where hypnosis is frequently
used in investigating a crime.
The victim in Hurd was stabbed repeatedly in the early morn-
ing hours of June 22, 1978.110 In the hospital following the attack,
she did not or could not identify her assailant. However, she asked
the police to "check out" her ex-husband, the defendant, and to
watch her children."' She consented to hypnosis to refresh her
memory and was subsequently hypnotized by a prominent New
York psychiatrist. 112
The psychiatrist, two police officers, and a medical student
were present during the session, which was recorded. The victim
knew the identity of one of the police suspects prior to being hyp-
lez, 108 Mich. App. 145, 310 N.W.2d 306 (1981).
107. State v. Koehler, 312 N.W.2d 108, 110 (Minn. 1981) (holding a witness may not
testify to matters adduced at pretrial hypnotic interview except as to such matters as were
previously and unequivocally disclosed by him prior to hypnosis). In Koehler, the witness's
incomplete and inaccurate recollection of the defendant's car near the scene of the murder
of a twelve-year-old girl became a positive identification of the car after hypnosis, eventu-
ally leading to a conviction for first degree murder.
108. Ruffra, supra note 90, at 323. In one California case the court already took such
a step back, distinguishing Shirley on facts and admitting hypnotically refreshed testimony.
People v. Adams, 137 Cal. App. 3d 346, 352, 187 Cal. Rptr. 505, 509 (1982).
109. 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981).
110. Id. at 529, 432 A.2d at 88.
111. Id. at 530, 432 A.2d at 88.
112. Id.
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notized. 113 Under hypnosis she identified her ex-husband as the
assailant after a series of leading questions, one referring to him
by name. 14
After the session, the victim's skepticism about the identifica-
tion was overcome by the psychiatrist and detective. They sug-
gested that without the identification her present husband would
remain a suspect, her assailant would remain free to strike again,
and her children could become motherless. 1 5 Six days later she
positively confirmed the earlier identification, setting the stage for
the trial of her ex-husband.
The trial court suppressed the proffered identification. The
court found that the state had failed to show by clear and convinc-
ing evidence: (1) that it had complied, when administering the
hypnosis, with procedural safeguards adopted by the court, a" 6 and
(2) that "no impermissably suggestive or coercive conduct by the
hypnotist and law enforcement personnel took place."""
On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed, holding
that "testimony enhanced through hypnosis is admissible at crimi-
nal trial if the court finds that the use of hypnosis in the particular
case was reasonably likely to result in recall comparable in accu-
racy to normal human memory." 1 8 The court stated that in ap-
plying this rule the trial court must first consider the appropriate-
ness of the hypnotic procedure used in light of the type of
memory loss encountered. 119 The trial court should also look to
the self-interestedness of the subject as part of this inquiry. 20
The second inquiry for the trial court under this standard is
whether the procedures followed were reasonably reliable. Ac-
cordingly, the court enumerated six guidelines which the propo-
nent of the evidence must show compliance with as a prerequisite
for admission.' 21 The six, simply stated, are: (1) the hypnotist
113. Id. at 531, 432 A.2d at 88.
114. Id. 432 A.2d at 89.
115. Id. Overzealousness on the part of law enforcement personnel such as this may
provide the best argument for prudent consideration and regulation by the courts of the
use of hypnosis as an investigative aid.
116. State v. Hurd, 173 N.J. Super. 333, 366, 414 A.2d 291, 307 (1980), affd, 86 N.J.
525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981).
117. Id. at 369, 414 A.2d at 306.
118. Hurd, 86 N.J. at 543, 432 A.2d at 95.
119. Id. at 544, 432 A.2d at 95.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 545, 432 A.2d at 96.
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must be a professional and must qualify as an expert to later aid
the court in evaluating reliability; (2) the hypnotist should be neu-
tral and not regularly employed by parties-at-interest in criminal
proceedings; (3) information acquired by the hypnotist from law
enforcement authorities prior to hypnosis must be recorded, ei-
ther in writing or another suitable form, so the court may evalu-
ate any suggestion which may have been communicated to the
subject; (4) the hypnotist must compile a detailed description of
any facts remembered prior to hypnosis and avoid any suggestion
of new information in the process; (5) all contacts between the
subject and the hypnotist during the hypnotic session must be re-
corded, preferably by videotape; and (6) only the hypnotist and
subject should be present during any phase of the hypnotic ses-
sion.a22 The court placed the burden of showing compliance with
these guidelines by clear and convincing evidence on the party
seeking to introduce the testimony.'23
The Hurd court also found it appropriate to apply the general
acceptance standard to hypnotically refreshed testimony. 12 4 In ap-
plying this standard the court relied on assertions that reliable sci-
entific procedures will produce accurate recall; 125 on contentions
that a large portion of the population is susceptible to hypnotic
memory restoration; 26 and on scientific literature and expert tes-
timony at the hearing below.' 27 The court held that in instances
where the hypnosis employed is able to yield memory as accurate
as normal memory, which is itself unreliable, the procedure satis-
fied the general acceptance standard and the evidence should be
admitted at trial.' 28
While it did take notice of the effects of enhanced suggestibil-
122. Id. at 545-46, 432 A.2d at 96-97.
123. Id. at 546, 432 A.2d at 97.
124. The New Jersey version of the general acceptance standard is that the results of
scientific tests are admissible if they have "sufficient scientific basis to produce uniform and
reasonably reliable results and will contribute materially to the ascertainment of truth." Id.
at 536, 432 A.2d at 91 (citing State v. Cary, 49 N.J. 343, 352, 230 A.2d 384, 389 (1967)).
The Hurd court stated that "the policy reasons embodied in the general acceptance
standard were germane to hypnotically refreshed testimony . Hurd, 86 N.J. at 536,
432 A.2d at 91.
125. See Hurd, 86 N.J. at 536, 432 A.2d at 91.
126. Id. at 537, 432 A.2d at 92.
127. For the Hurd court's discussion of the scientific authorities relied upon, see id. at
538-43, 432 A.2d at 92-95.
128. Id. at 538, 432 A.2d at 92.
1984]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
ity, loss of critical judgment, and the tendency to confuse source
of memory on the typical hypnotic subject,12 the Hurd court ex-
pressly rejected the per se approach. The court reasoned that the
per se rule utilized in Shirley was overinclusive since it excluded
testimony as trustworthy as that of a normal eyewitness.1 30 Noting
that suggestibility and the constructive nature of normal memory
result in inherent inaccuracies, the court reasoned that normal
recollection refreshed may also render cross-examination less ef-
fective.131 Clearly the rationale of the Hurd court rests largely on
the asserted analogy between problems of reliability of hypnoti-
cally refreshed recall and those of normal human memory. The
court saw reliability on a par with that of normal memory as the
key to admissibility of hypnotically refreshed recall, assuming
throughout the feasibility of such a determination. As such, just as
testimony based on normal memory in some instances may be ad-
missible though inaccurate, the Hurd court felt the same possibil-
ity properly permissible with respect to hypnotically refreshed
recall.
D. Critique of Hurd
Despite its implicit yet clear statement to the contrary, 32 the
court in Hurd undermined a number of the policy considerations
traditionally embodied in the general acceptance standard. Those
policy considerations, seen as appropriately applied to novel scien-
tific evidence even by the standard's critics, 33 include: (1) defer-
ring decisionmaking to those most qualified to assess the validity
of the scientific procedures used; (2) shielding the jury from the
misleading aura of such evidence through adoption of a conserva-
tive standard of admissibility; (3) assuring the availability of ex-
perts to assist interested parties; and (4) establishing clear appel-
129. Id. at 539-40, 432 A.2d at 93.
130. Id. at 541, 432 A.2d at 94.
131. Id. at 541-42, 432 A.2d at 94-95.
132. Id. at 536, 432 A.2d at 91.
133. See, e.g., Gianelli, supra note 76, at 1207, 1245-50. Professor Gianelli takes notice
of the underlying values of the Frye standard, but advocates replacing the ambiguous stan-
dard with some kind of enhanced burden of proof; perhaps a beyond a reasonable doubt
standard as to reliability. See also McCormick, supra note 76, at 880, 883, 911-15. Professor
McCormick, while recognizing the propriety of the policies behind the general acceptance
standard, argues that these same goals may be achieved by applying a traditional relevancy
approach to scientific evidence.
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late precedent until acceptance of hypnosis as a reliable memory-
jogging device by the relevant scientific community occurs."',
The Hurd court undermined the first value of the general ac-
ceptance standard by moving the determination of reliability from
experts in the relevant scientific community to the trial court at a
pretrial hearing. The case-by-case approach similarly fails to in-
sure the input of expert witnesses to aid in the determination
since adversaries must provide their own experts at the hearing.
While providing expert witnesses is a minor burden on the vast
resources of the state, an indigent defendant seeking to rebut the
reliability of a prosecution witness's memory may find this burden
a substantial one. Avoiding the econfomic burden of such a battle
of the experts is another basic value underlying the general ac-
ceptance standard when applied to novel scientific evidence. 13 5
Similarly, the value of uniformity and clear precedent is un-
dermined by the uncertainty of outcome inherent in the Hurd ap-
proach. Even assuming compliance with the six procedural guide-
lines, similar fact situations may result in different outcomes on
the admissibility issue. Differences in expert testimony at the sup-
pression hearing, the nature of the questioning by the hypnotist,
the hypnotizability of the subject, the professed reason for loss of
memory, and the extent of the subject's pre-hypnotic recall might
tip the determination one way or the otber. Evaluation of these
and other factors relevant to the admissibility issue, a considerable
task for even a qualified psychotherapist well versed in the use of
hypnosis, is the responsibility of the trial judge under Hurd. This
may lead to an array of results of little precedential value, some-
134. See generally McCormick, supra note 76, at 883 (outlining the virtues of the gen-
eral acceptance standard as various courts have identified them). See also United States v.
Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 556-57 (6th Cir. 1977) (discussing the goals achieved by the Frye
standard).
135. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine characterized this economic burden in the
following manner:
To adhere to the Frye standard requiring general-but not univer-
sal-acceptance within the scientific community will enhance the fairness of the
trial, especially in criminal cases. It will avoid the difficulty of rebutting the ex-
pert's opinion except by other experts or by cross-examination grounded upon
a thorough acquaintance with the novel application of scientific principles. This
burden of rebuttal is generally borne in these criminal cases by defendants with-
out the economic means to marshal scientific witnesses for a battle of the
experts.
State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500, 506 (Me. 1978).
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times owing to personal biases of particular judges. This complex
web of precedent may in turn deter law enforcement authorities
from assuming the risk of utilizing hypnosis in the most appropri-
ate of cases. Such uncertainty also provides incentive for frequent
challenges to hypnotically refreshed testimony both at a prelimi-
nary hearing and on appeal-an unattractive consequence in light
of already overtaxed court calendars.
Thus, the consumption of time and trial resources the case-
by-case approach requires has been a frequently cited criticism
prevalent in the cases expressly rejecting it.136 In Commonwealth v.
Kater'37 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in rejecting
Hurd, zeroed in on the problem, stating that such a "time-con-
suming and expensive course is precisely what the [general accept-
ance] test seeks to avoid."138
While the Hurd approach does shield the jury from poten-
tially misleading evidence when the determination is made that
the testimony is inadmissible, it may potentially admit post-hyp-
notic testimony which is the product of suggestibility and confabu-
lation. Again this is due to the assumption adopted by the court
that hypnotically refreshed testimony may be shown to be as relia-
ble as normal recall, a premise to be addressed below.
The Hurd court's assertion that its manner of applying the
general acceptance standard invokes the beneficial policies under-
lying the standard lacks merit in light of the foregoing analysis.
The increasing use of forensic hypnosis and the variation in state
court approaches to the admissibility issue may be added reasons
for courts to stick closely to the values underlying the conservative
general acceptance standard. When reliability and its ultimate le-
gal consequences are so uncertain, clear guidelines with respect to
136. The Hurd court itself expressed concern over the potential consumption of trial
resources and confusion of the issues should the testimony be introduced before the jury
and both adversaries subsequently address the reliability of the testimony with experts. 86
NJ. at 537, 432 A.2d at 92. However, the court failed to consider this same problem in
light of its own decision to let the trial judge make a pretrial determination of reliability in
each case.
137. 388 Mass. 519, 447 N.E.2d 1190 (1983).
138. Id. at 526, 447 N.E.2d at 1196. See also State v. Palmer, 210 Neb. 206, 217, 313
N.W.2d 648, 654 (1981) (case-by-case approach neither sound nor practical); State ex rel.
Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 198, 644 P.2d 1266, 1284 (1982) (Feldman, J.,
supplemental opinion) (case-by-case approach is prohibitively expensive). For an explana-
tion of the general acceptance standard and a discussion of a number of its applications, see
supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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post-hypnotic testimony for the sake of lower courts and criminal
investigators adapting police practices to legal rules are a neces-
sity. 39 This consideration was apparently overlooked by the Hurd
court.
A second flaw of the Hurd court rationale is its reliance on
the similar degree of unreliability of hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony and normal memory. The Shirley court, finding that factors
contributing to the unreliability of normal memory were en-
hanced by hypnosis,' 40 expressly rejected this premise. Empirical
studies suggest that hypnotically retrieved memory is significantly
less accurate than normal memory and thus tend to support the
latter view.
One such study tested the accuracy and confidence level of
two sets of subjects in remembering the details of a videotape
shown to all. One group was asked the fifteen questions, including
six of a leading nature, while under hypnosis. The others were
questioned in the waking state.141 On the six leading questions
posed, the hypnotized subjects made a statistically-significant
greater number of errors than those in the waking state. How-
ever, the previously hypnotized subjects expressed the same confi-
dence in their answers as the others, felt they had been more ac-
curate due to hypnosis, and stated that in a real situation they
would prefer to be questioned under hypnosis to improve their
recall. 42 The author of the study suggests that in a criminal inves-
tigation greater inaccuracy could result due to witness self-interest
in providing the information.1 43 It must be noted that proponents
of the forensic use of hypnosis would disavow these results. In
their view, hypnosis is effective in overcoming the psychological
blocks resulting from the trauma of witnessing the criminal event,
a factor unaccounted for in the use of the nonstressful film in the
study.1 44
139. See note 123 infra.
140. 31 Cal. 3d at 62-63, 641 P.2d at 801, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 270. The Shirley court
expressly states that disagreement with the Hurd court on this point is why it rejects the
Hurd approach. Id. at 62-63 & n.44, 641 P.2d at 802 & n.44, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 270 & n.44.
141. See Putnam, Hypnosis and Distortions in Eyewitness Memory, 27 INT'L J. CLINICAL &
EXPERIMENTAL HYPNosis 437, 441 (1979). The videotape shown to both groups of subjects
was of a car-bicycle accident.
142. Id. at 444.
143. Id. at 445-46.
144. Putnam was well aware of this argument in discussing his results:
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To better test this thesis a subsequent study exposed subjects
to a highly stressful film. 1 " Twenty factual questions, five of
which were leading, tested the subjects on the accuracy of their
recall. 46 The hypnotized subjects gave significantly less accurate
answers to leading questions than the non-hypnotized subjects.
Again, the confidence levels of both groups were largely the
same.14 Although stress levels in actual forensic applications may
still vary slightly from experimental ones, 148 the results still sug-
gest that eyewitnesses subjected to hypnosis will have significantly
less accurate recall of stressful events than normal eyewitnesses.
The court's reliance on a similar degree of accuracy of both types
of memory was clearly misplaced and contrary to the weight of
empirical evidence. It follows that a trial court determination of
whether a hypnotized witness's memory is reasonably likely to be as
accurate as normal memory cannot be based on a review of the
procedures employed. Such a determination would only be conjec-
tural and would be unsupported by the best available empirical
evidence.
A third shortcoming of the Hurd approach is that the re-
quired procedures are on their face insufficient to guard against
all the effects contributing to the unreliability of hypnotically re-
freshed recall. As the Shirley court observed, 149 the requirement
In the present experiment, no attempt was made to upset [subjects] because of
the obvious ethical considerations involved. The data indicate that hypnosis
may not aid recall when there is little emotional involvement on the part of the
witness; they do not indicate that hypnosis will never aid recall. It may be that
hypnosis aids recall by reducing retrieval difficulties caused specifically by emo-
tionally upsetting events. However, there is currently no evidence from rigor-
ous empirical studies to support this notion. This topic is ripe for further inves-
tigation and the research is long overdue.
Id. See also Zelig & Beidleman, The Investigative Use of Hypnosis: A Word of Caution, 29 INT'L
J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIs 401, 404 (1981) (discussing how Putnam's study did
not necessarily contradict the theory espoused by proponents of forensic hypnosis and how
their study would more directly address this theory).
145. The film viewed by subjects was of a number of industrial accidents. In one scene
a worker lost a finger in a router. Another scene depicted a worker mishandling a circular
saw, thereby causing a board to be ejected, impaling and killing a co-worker. The first
accident was vividly presented and occurred unexpectedly while the second was less sponta-
neous due to visual and verbal cues which built up the subjects' anticipation. Zelig & Bei-
dleman, supra note 144, at 404-05.
146. Id. at 405.
147. Id. at 407-08 & Table 2.
148. Id. at 409.
149. 31 Cal. 3d at 39 n.24, 641 P.2d at 787 n.24, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 255 n.24.
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that the hypnosis session be recorded does not insure that the trial
court can identify the subtle cues of demeanor, voice inflections,
body language, and subtlely leading questions.15 The California
court labelled the Hurd court's assumption that the trial court
judge was qualified to detect and evaluate suggestibility based on
such a recording "vain."15 In addition, the guidelines adopted do
not address the loss of critical judgment affecting the previously
hypnotized witness. 52 The court's failure to address this effect,
which jeopardizes the defendant's right to confrontation by effec-
tive cross-examination, suggests a dangerous ambivalence towards
traditional values of fairness in criminal trials.
Finally, the required procedures may simply prove to be un-
workable. To adequately record the hypnosis session, cameras
trained on both subject and hypnotist are necessary. Thus the re-
quirement that the two be alone during the session appears to be
difficult to comply with. 53 Hypnosis rooms with hidden dual cam-
eras would be impractical and prohibitively costly for most law en-
forcement agencies. The ambiguity of the required procedures
with respect to the proper qualifications of the hypnotist, the ex-
tent of the hypnotist's neutrality, and how best to record a wit-
ness's certainty with respect to prior recall, make compliance with
the procedures burdensome and unpredictable. While adoption of
administrative guidelines for implementation of hypnosis might
remedy problems of clarity,15 emphasis on such guidelines may
enhance the myth of reliability in the minds of both judges and
jurors. As one court cynically noted: "The standards, themselves,
would give the hypnotic process an aura of reliability which, in
actuality, it does not possess. It is far too likely that a jury would
be even less critical of the testimony because of the indicia of reli-
ability provided by such standards.' 1 55
Despite these shortcomings, courts in a few states have
adopted approaches similar to that of Hurd. In rejecting the per se
inadmissible rule of its sister state Arizona, the New Mexico Court
150. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
151. 31 Cal. 3d at 39 n.24, 641 P.2d at 787 n.24, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 255 n.24.
152. Id. at 39, 641 P.2d at 787, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 255.
153. Id. at 40 n.25, 641 P.2d at 787 n.25, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 255 n.25.
154. The FBI has adopted such administrative guidelines. See Ault, FBI Guidelines for
the Use of Hypnosis, 27 INT'L J. LCLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNosIs 449, 449-50 (1979).
155. People v. Gonzalez, 108 Mich. App. 145, 160, 310 N.W.2d 306, 313 (1981).
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of Appeals15 proclaimed:
The better rule is that testimony of pre-hypnotic recollections is admissible
in the sound discretion of the trial court, but post-hypnotic recollections,
received by hypnotic procedure, are only admissible in a trial where a
proper foundation has also established the expertise of the hypnotist and
that the techniques employed were correctly performed, free from bias or
improper suggestibility.
15 7
The court then went on to adopt the required procedures of the
Hurd court, again assuming their effectiveness in guarding against
suggestibility.1 58
Most state courts confronting the issue in recent years have
opted not to follow this view, however. In fact, a significant num-
ber of courts that have expressly considered the Hurd approach
have rejected it, citing one or more of the foregoing shortcom-
ings." ' This alone suggests that the trend is away from the case-
156. State v. Beachum, 97 N.M. 682, 643 P.2d 246 (Ct. App. 1981).
157. Id. at 688, 643 P.2d at 252.
158. Id. at 689-90, 643 P.2d at 253-54. For other authority supporting the case-by-
case approach, see Warner, The Use of Hypnosis in the Defense of Criminal Cases, 27 INT'L J.
CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNosis 417, 427-3Q (1979); Brown v. State, 426 So. 2d 76,
90-93 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (rejecting the applicability of Frye standard; calling for a
case-by-case determination of admissibility to be based upon compliance with Hurd-like
safeguards and consideration of independent corroborating evidence, and requiring liberal
cross-examination and cautionary jury instructions; People v. Smrekar, 68 Il1. App. 3d 379,
388, 385 N.E.2d 848, 855 (1979) (applying a case-by-case determination considering the
competence of the hypnotist, the suggestiveness of the hypnotic session, independent cor-
roborating evidence not known to the witness, and the opportunity of the witness to view
the alleged defendant); People v. Gibson, 117 Ill. App. 3d 270, 274, 277, 452 N.E.2d
1371, 1372, 1374 (1983) (renewing support for Smrekar standards but declining to adopt
the Hurd safeguards in toto); Comment, Hypnosis-Should the Courts Snap Out of It?-A Closer
Look at the Critical Issues, 44 Omo ST. L.J. 1053, 1071-73 (1983) (advocating Hurd-type safe-
guards as proper foundation for admissibility). Prior to Hughes a few lower New York
courts had adopted an analagous safeguards approach. See People v. Lewis, 103 Misc. 2d
881, 883-84, 427 N.Y.S.2d 177, 179 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (employing nine procedural safe-
guards similar to those promulgated in Hurd); People v. McDowell, 103 Misc. 2d 831, 427
N.Y.S.2d 181 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
159. People v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 543-44, 453 N.E.2d 484, 494-95, 466
N.Y.S.2d 255, 265-66 (1983); People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 40, 641 P.2d 775, 787-88,
181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 256 (1982) (in bank); Commonwealth v. Kater, 388 Mass. 519, 526-28,
447 N.E.2d 1190, 1196 (1983); State v. Palmer, 210 Neb. 206, 217-18, 313 N.W.2d 648,
654-55 (1981); State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 186-87, 644 P.2d
1266, 1272-73 (1982) (in banc); Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 109, 436 A.2d
170, 177 (1981); People v. Gonzalez, 108 Mich. App. 145, 159-60, 310 N.W.2d 306, 313
(1981); Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d 1280, 1282-84, 1284-85 (Wyo. 1982). But cf People v.
District Court, 652 P.2d 582 (Colo. 1982) (en banc) (refusing to upset ruling of trial court
adopting Hurd approach).
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by-case approach.
III. THE PREFERRED APPROACH OF People v. Hughes
A. The Hughes Rationale
The foregoing criticisms of the Shirley and Hurd approaches
shed light on the policy reasons for the distinction in treatment of
pre-hypnotic and post-hypnotic memory drawn by the court in
People v. Hughes. The Hughes court took judicial notice of the case-
by-case approach of Hurd,160 the per se inadmissible rule of Shir-
ley, 6" and the hybrid approach it eventually adopted." 2 In declar-
ing its preference, the court noted that in New York an increased
standard of reliability has been adopted whereby testimony as to a
scientific procedure utilized has a direct, potentially damaging ef-
fect on the jury's assessment of eyewitness credibility. 63 This, and
the inherent suggestibility of forensic hypnosis, led the court to
apply the Frye standard of general acceptance in the scientific
community relevant to the issue at hand. 64 The court quickly dis-
posed of the question of general acceptance: "It is evident, how-
ever, that at the present time hypnosis has not achieved that
status." 165
The Hughes court then proceeded to consider the case-by-case
approach of Hurd. The court noted that regulating the conduct of
the hypnotist and investigators in no way protected the resulting
recall from taint due to a particular subject's greater susceptibility
to suggestion or tendency to confabulate. Nor do the adopted
guidelines guard against the undetectibility of unreliable facts. 6
The court refused to adopt the Hurd approach, finding recall that
is solely the result of hypnosis to be always inadmissible. 67
160. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d at 539, 453 N.E.2d at 492, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 260.
161. Id. at 539-40, 453 N.E.2d at 492, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 263.
162. Id. at 539, 453 N.E.2d at 492, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 263.
163. See, e.g., People v. Allweiss, 48 N.Y.2d 40, 50, 396 N.E.2d 735, 740, 421
N.Y.S.2d 341, 345 (1979) (no enhanced standard since expert testified as to results of hair
strand analysis, not as to credibility of witness).
164. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d at 543, 453 N.E.2d at 494, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 265. For a discus-
sion of the Fiye standard, see supra note 76 and accompanying text.
165. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d at 543, 453 N.E.2d at 494, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 265.
166. Id. at 543-544, 453 N.E.2d at 494-95, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 265-66.
167. See id. at 545, 453 N.E.2d at 495, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 266. The Hughes court also
noted that had the safeguards approach been adopted, the facts of the case showed that
hypnosis had not been used in compliance with all the required procedures. Id. at 544, 453
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With respect to pre-hypnotic recall, the Hughes court refused
to extend the inadmissibility rule, stressing the utility of hypnosis
as a means of gaining increased, though potentially inaccurate, re-
call of leads in difficult criminal cases. 168 However, the court
found that the danger of increased confidence on the part of the
subject in his original recall necessitated resolution at the pretrial
stage of two issues: the precise extent of the subject's pre-hypnotic
recall, and the suggestiveness of the hypnotic procedures used in
the particular case. 16 The proponent of the evidence assumes the
burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that the sub-
ject's testimony as to his pre-hypnotic memory will not substan-
tially impair the defendant's right to confrontation. 70
Under this scheme, the scope of the witness's pre-hypnotic
memory will be determined on the basis of testimonial and docu-
mentary evidence of events prior to and during the hypnotic ses-
sion. Thus a detailed recording in some form of the subject's pre-
hypnotic statements may be useful in making the required show-
ing. As to the suggestiveness of the procedures, the Hughes court
stated that safeguards recommended in other cases may be perti-
nent, though it did not make them mandatory.11 1 Thus the nar-
rower issue of the admissibility of -testimony as to pre-hypnotic
memory must still be resolved in a case-by-case manner.
The Hughes court thus adopted a component of the Shirley
rule with respect to testimony as to post-hypnotic recall without
finding the subject totally incompetent to testify. The inadmissibil-
ity of such testimony stemmed from the determination that testi-
mony that was solely the product of hypnosis was not generally
accepted as reliable in the relevant scientific community. Testi-
mony as to pre-hypnotic recall, not necessarily affected by the
hypnosis, was excluded from the scope of the inadmissibility rule.
N.E.2d at 495, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 266. Thus the court clearly went further than necessary to
resolve the problem presented by the fact pattern at hand. This suggests the court's strong
displeasure with the Hurd approach and desire to set strong precedent in dealing with this
issue in the first instance.
168. Id. at 545, 453 N.E.2d at 495, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 266.
169. Id. at 546-47, 453 N.E.2d at 496, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 266-67.
170. Id. at 547, 453 N.E.2d at 497, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 267. A useful practice aid for the
prosecutor or defense attorney trying to establish or refute this burden of proof in such a
pretrial hearing is the transcript of the testimony of the clinical psychologist who con-
ducted the hypnosis in Hughes. See 1 NEw YORK EVIDENCE (MB) § 26.08, at 244.1-244.101
(Dec. 1984).
171. Id. at 547, 453 N.E. 2d at 496, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 267.
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Accordingly, the Hughes court adopted the Hurd case-by-case ap-
proach with respect to pre-hypnotic recall. A brief review of the
shortcomings of these alternatives in light of Hughes suggests that
the bifurcated approach is a prudent method of resolving or mini-
mizing these practical and policy difficulties.
B. The Promise of the Hughes Approach
The Hughes approach clearly resolves the basic practical and
policy shortcomings of the Shirley rule. The overinclusiveness of
Shirley is not present in this approach since properly preserved
facts recalled prior to hypnosis may be testified to at trial. The
difficult strategy decision confronting law enforcement officials
discussed above is eliminated. They only need decide what proce-
dures to employ to properly safeguard facts already known from
the potential taint of the hypnosis, rather than whether to hypno-
tize or not. It follows that the practical deterrent effect of the
Shirley rule on the use of this valuable law enforcement tool may
be minimized with the adoption of procedural guidelines in accor-
dance with the Hughes opinion. At the same time, the adoption of
the conservative "clear and convincirig" evidence standard to
show the reliability of pre-hypnotic recall before admitting such
testimony will have the effect of deterring abusive uses of hypno-
sis, such as calming a nervous witness or bolstering a key witness's
confidence in an uncertain story. The danger of tainting a pri-
mary witness's testimony only becomes worth the risk in the
proper cases, such as where the witness's recall is limited, no sus-
pect has been positively identified, and little or no other evidence
is presently available or likely to become available by other
means.
1 12
Similarly, the shortcomings previously identified as being im-
172. The Hughes court expressly placed the burden of proof as to reliability of pre-
hypnotic recall on the prosecution and stated that the defendant should have the opportu-
nity to rebut such a showing. Id. at 547, 453 N.E.2d at 496-97, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 267. Thus,
the Hughes court implicitly failed to address the status of this approach in the case where
the defendant is subjected to pretrial hypnosis. However, if this approach is extended to
such a case, a balance between logical application of the evidentiary rule to both situations
and minimal interference with the defendant's right to be heard, conspicuously absent in
Shirley, would be present. In addition, the potential abusive uses by defense counsel, see
supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text, would be deterred since the threshold burden of
establishing the scope of pre-hypnotic recall and the certainty of that recall would now be
on the defendant.
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plicit in the Hurd approach17 3 are eliminated or minimized under
Hughes. By adopting a per se rule with respect to post-hypnotic
recall, Hughes invokes the policies of the traditional general ac-
ceptance standard overlooked in Hurd.174 This component of the
rule adopts clear precedent with respect to post-hypnotic testi-
mony for trial courts. The complexity of the task of evaluating
both the subtle psychological factors contributing to the success of
any prospective hypnosis175 and the incidental effects that hypno-
sis may have on the reliability and credibility of a witness17 6 must
be viewed in the context of the ever increasing use of hypnosis in
criminal investigations. The burden placed on trial courts by
Hurd, the responsibility for a determination with respect to post-
hypnotic testimony that experts can only speculate on,177 is clearly
unreasonable. The per se rule recognized the unsuitability of the
trial court to determine the reliability of post-hypnotic recall and
leaves for a later day the opportunity for courts to liberalize the
rule in response to greater scientific understanding of when and
under what circumstances hypnotic procedures will produce relia-
ble recall.
Adoption of the per se inadmissible rule with respect to post-
hypnotic recall also implies recognition by the Hughes court that
no means are currently available to determine if hypnotically re-
freshed testimony in a given instance is as accurate as normal
memory. This is a prudent position in light of the available scien-
tific empirical evidence suggesting the enhanced unreliability of
hypnotically refreshed testimony. 78
The Hughes approach also mitigates the inherent unfairness
of the state's greater resources in providing expert witnesses to
aid in the case-by-case determination and eliminates the need for
extensive and time-consuming pretrial hearings.1 79 While hearings
173. See supra notes 131-57 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 18-43 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 138-46 and accompanying text.
179. Some alternative proposals appear to give inadequate consideration to these pol-
icy considerations, proposing virtual mini-trials on the reliability of hypnosis in each in-
stance. See, e.g., Note, The Admissibility of Testimony Influenced By Hypnosis, 67 VA. L. REV.
1203 (1981). The author proposes a three stage procedure which includes application for a
warrant to hypnotize, a pretrial hearing, and presentation of the evidence at trial. The
party seeking to invoke hypnosis would apply to the court showing the circumstances under
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and experts may still be important to the determination with re-
spect to pre-hypnotic recall, the relevant issues are narrowed to
what pre-hypnotic facts were actually known and with what cer-
tainty. It is conceivable that a defendant subjected to pretrial hyp-
nosis who seeks to testify as to pre-hypnotic recall could meet the
burden of showing lack of taint without any experts at all. A video
or audio tape of the defendant narrating the facts of the incident
that he can recall, or a detailed deposition and subsequent testi-
mony as to the subject's demeanor and certainty, may meet the
burden for admissibility of pre-hypnotic testimony without putting
hypnosis itself on trial in each case.' 80 Accordingly, the burdens
imposed on trial resources and the defendant's pocketbook by the
Hurd approach are minimized.
Additional refinement of Hughes might further reduce these
burdens. Requiring the proponent of the use of hypnosis to make
an application for a court order granting permission to invoke
hypnosis and obtain such an order before any pre-hypnotic state-
ments of a witness subjected to pretrial hypnosis would be admit-
ted may be such a refinement. The application might consist of a
detailed deposition or recording of the witness's present recall, af-
which it would be used and would be required to notify opposing counsel of this applica-
tion. If the opponent objected, a hearing could be held on the merits of the court order.
Id. at 1229. The argument assumes that a defendant is already in custody if it assumes that
opposing counsel can be notified. This is contrary to the observation that most cases where
hypnosis is invoked relate to difficult investigations where little or no identification evi-
dence exists and the investigation is stalled. See, e.g., supra notes 6, 58, 60, 91, and accom-
panying text. After hypnosis was used, the proponent would still have the burden of prov-
ing that the hypnosis was not unreliable in light of the procedures used to admit the
testimony at trial. Again the defendant would have the opportunity to rebut its reliability.
Once admitted at trial, the jury would not be informed that the subject had been hypno-
tized unless the opponent raised the point on cross-examination.
If raised in this manner the testimony could be challenged at trial by use of experts and
cross-examination. Id. at 1229-30. Even assuming hypnosis would be needed if the defen-
dant is already identifiable, it is doubtful that such a time consuming, costly, and potentially
issue-confusing process would be worth the trouble. Note, The Continuing Controversy of Hyp-
nosis in the Legal Setting-The Need for a More Flexible Approach, 12 MEm. ST. U.L. REv. 471,
526 (1982). The traditional concerns of confusion of the issues and consumption of time at
trial might preclude the third stage of this process before the jury alone. In addition, this
proposal assumes that the witness subjected to hypnosis may still be vulnerable to effective
cross-examination should defense counsel challenge his or her testimony at trial; an as-
sumption unwarranted in light of the views of the experts. See supra notes 41-47 and ac-
companying text.
180. For other cases similar to Hughes where the proponent must show that the sub-
ject demonstrably and unequivocally recalled pre-hypnotic facts before they would be ad-
mitted at trial, see cases cited supra note 10.
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fidavits of investigators as to the nature and circumstances of the
crime and evidence or other witnesses presently available, and a
statement by the psychologist potentially administering the hypno-
sis as to what techniques would be employed. The court could
look to the necessity of using hypnosis to aid in the investigation
and the probability that the techniques employed will avoid taint
of pre-hypnotic recall to determine whether to sanction the hyp-
nosis. If court permission is given, at the later pretrial hearing the
proponent of the pre-hypnotic testimony need only make a show-
ing that the techniques in the psychologist's affidavit previously
presented were followed to create a presumption of admissibility.
The opponent of the evidence could only rebut the presumption
by challenging the scope of the witness's pre-hypnotic recall or its
certainty, as reflected in the material submitted in support of the
hypnosis order. Shifting the burden in this manner allows the
court to regulate the use of forensic hypnosis, confining it to those
cases where such use is most proper.""" In addition, since the pre-
sumption of admissibility is established at an early stage of an in-
vestigation when the order is granted (often when no suspect has
yet been identified), no unintended bias or prejudice against a par-
ticular defendant would enter into the determination with respect
to admissibility of pre-hypnotic testimony. The proponent's show-
ing at the pretrial hearing is reduced, further shortening the time
expended in such a hearing. The result is close judicial regulation
of the use of forensic hypnosis with minimal consumption of time
and defense resources at a pretrial hearing. 8 2
The Hughes court left flexibility as to guidelines and factors to
be considered by the trial court in gauging the taint of pre-hyp-
notic recall. In this manner the court avoided the trap that a strict
set of procedural guidelines may pose, giving testimony an aura of
reliability in the eyes of the court or jury which is unwarranted
due to inadequate procedural safeguards.8 3 The broader issues of
the suggestibility of the hypnosis and its effect on the witness's
credibility are best addressed by a complete and up-to-date set of
181. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
182. Closerjudicial regulation might prevent the overuse of hypnosis in cases where it
may not be necessary. For an example of a case where hypnosis probably should not have
been used, see Commonwealth v. Taylor, 294 Pa. Super. 171, 439 A.2d 805 (1982) (dis-
cussed supra note 59).
183. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
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guidelines rather than the strict judicial checklist proposed in
Hurd.1 14 While the six guidelines outlined in Hurd may be a start-
ing point, a requirement that the hypnotist receive, in written
memorandum form, only those facts from the police that are nec-
essary to frame the interview should be added. 85 An expression
of judicial preference for a narrative account by the subject rather
than a question and answer type interview while under hypnosis
would also be appropriate. A narrative of the facts reduces the
likelihood of leading questions by the hypnotist as well as other
forms of subtle suggestion. 88 In addition to these guidelines, the
flexibility allowed by the court allows other courts in the future to
adopt new safeguards as scientific memory research in the area of
forensic hypnosis discovers additional factors tending to increase
or decrease suggestibility.
CONCLUSION
The approach towards hypnotically refreshed testimony
adopted in People v. Hughes resolves or minimizes many of the
practical and policy defects of recent alternatives with respect to
the issue of admissibility at criminal trials. It affords maximum
protection of a defendant from the inherently unreliable and po-
tentially harmful testimony of a witness as to events only recalled
under hypnosis. At the same time, it preserves the availability to
criminal investigators of a useful forensic technique under circum-
stances where little other evidence is available and a witness's
memory is blocked or limited. As such it represents a carefully
conceived compromise designed to protect two legitimate and
compelling values underlying our criminal justice system: the right
of a criminal defendant to a fundamentally fair trial and the inter-
184. As has previously been noted, the Hurd safeguards appear inadequate to protect
against all the effects of the suggestibility of hypnosis. See supra notes 147-53 and accompa-
nying text.
185. This will reduce the possibility that the hypnotist will convey any subtle sugges-
tions to the subject during the hypnotic session and allow the court to evaluate at the pre-
trial hearing what may have been conveyed between hypnotist and subject. See, e.g., People
v. McDowell, 103 Misc. 2d 831, 834, 427 N.Y.S.2d 181, 183 (Sup. Ct. 1980); People v.
Lewis, 103 Misc. 2d 881, 883, 427 N.Y.S.2d 177, 179 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
186. A narrative account by the subject during the hypnotic session is less susceptible
to suggestion than an account conveyed through a normal question-and-answer type inter-
view. Hilgard & Loftus, Effective Interrogation of Eyewitnesses, 27 IN'L J. CLINICAL & EXPERI-
MENTAL HYPNOSIS 342, 348 (1979); Orne, supra note 20, at 324.
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est of society in enhancing the efficiency of law enforcement by
equipping investigators under the proper circumstances with this
valuable forensic technique. It is the inherent balancing of these
often competing values which makes the bifurcated approach of
Hughes the most attractive alternative and the likely trend for the
immediate future.
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